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Abstract: A viable way to defend the rights of later picture makes to use and
change the works of their predecessors is by reference to the artistic merit of the
later works. Rob Scholte intentionally infringes on copyright law by making new
works, and it is the artistic merit of his work that should give him that liberty.
I. PERCEPTION AND DEPICTION
We need our perception to find our way in the world around us. We walk
inside the images there; the images of perception are processes—not snap
shots. Nor are they merely visual. What we see is something we have often
already heard coming, and whatever we touch we will already have an idea of
how it will feel, based on how it looks. We experience the images of perception
from their insides. As a consequence, we do not give due attention to the
images that they are, and forget about them once we have done our thing in
them. Who remembers what the world looked like when they got out onto
the street this morning? Situations that we find ourselves in are images and
this seems quite obvious.1 Yet, we do not normally acknowledge this fact. Of
course, we don’t. Why would we? It is evident that whenever something
happens an image of it comes along.
People turn the images of perception into fixed images, by making photos
of almost anything. The world is filled with these pictures, as well, not just
with the images of perception. Rob Scholte, with a clear sense of humour,
presents images that we mostly do not realise noticing. Images that slip
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through our fingers permanently. What Scholte does can best be understood
as reanimating images. He does not depict, i.e. capture or take them, as a
photographer does.
A perception is a process. For instance, when passing a tree we see it and
we hear it. We see how high it rises. We see its colours, its form. Perhaps
we touch its bark. We see the leaves move in the wind. From the vehemence
of their movements we see how hard the wind blows—as we already heard
and felt. Writing things down explicitly like this turns perception into a
sequence of separate events, which it isn’t. Perception is a dynamic process,
consisting in the whole of the world that surrounds us, delivered through all
of our senses and our imagination. Perception, also, is a thick process, which
means that whatever happens in it may have a consequence for our actions.
When we see a cat being run over we will normally feel sorry. We are morally
engaged in the world of our perceptions. Not only do we perceive it through
all of our senses—and our imagination2—we also perceive it as the embodied
persons, moral agents, that we are. From a photograph of the tree, little of
this agential, and often also moral entanglement would show. A photograph
is thin.
The image in a photo is exclusively visual. The image of perception, in
contrast, consists of elements available to all of our senses, as well as memories
and anticipations thereof. The full dynamics of perception is replaced in
a photograph by a two-dimensional flat and still visual surface. Looking
at a photograph, you don’t feel the urge to respond—because it is, simply,
impossible to do so. The point is: events form images. Perception is a
coherent whole of images.3
We make the images of perception all by ourselves, it seems, just by
moving about. Yet they also form a continuum: each one image transmogrifies
into the next. When you watch the tree and then the cat, you also see the
images in between. We change the images of perception by moving our bodies.
Moreover, what is in our perceptions moves, as well. All this from the inside
of the images.
Nothing in our perception decides where one image stops and the next
begins. Not even the spectator. You can really only delimit perception by
depiction; by making a photo of the tree and then one of the cat. A photo-
graph provides a subdued image, reducing the dynamics of real perception.
Of course, more can be said about photography, but I’m interested here in
the difference between thick and thin images. What we perceive around us
is connected to us seeing it. Someone who sees you while you are watching
the street may be standing next to you—together, you may watch something.
The world of perception is filled with meanings—for you, as much as for the
others. A picture removes that dynamic, as well.
In the first part of this article, I mentioned copyright as a central theme
in Rob Scholte’s work. When we see the copyright sign we know what that
means: apparently, something is protected by law. You may not copy it.
Rob shows in many of his works that he views copyright as a problem. He
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uses famous logos in his works—not in ways their owners would like. He also
painted a large copyright sign, commenting on copyright law.4 ‘I turned the
copyright sign into a work of art, which copyright law must now protect; may
anyone still use it without that infringing on my work?’ (That is the political
gesture in the work I do not discuss now.) The painted copyright sign does
something else as well. It shows that the copyright sign itself has always also
been an image. We tend to forget this because we always immediately think
of its legal meaning. An artist like Rob Scholte zooms in on this. Once you
realise how this work shows us that something is an image before anything
else, you start recognising this as a thread in his work throughout.
Figure 1: Rob Scholte: matches, brands.
Something is an image if it is meaningful in our perception. To see the
image is to experience that meaning, or at least part of it. We forget we
perceive images because we are so engrossed in their meaning. So what is it
that Scholte does? I think, he is bringing images that are meaningful, though
we never noticed or forgot, to our attention. With Scholte, art remains alive—
by being imagery, in the thick sense. I’m talking about what Scholte sees,
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and how he makes us see it, too; about the core of his artistry. I’m not so
much interested in his societal criticism or his art historical considerations;
nor about the fact that Rob shows images that the art world looks down
upon, like embroidery; but about the fact that he reanimates their soul—as
well as ours. He makes us present again—to meaning.
II. THICK IMAGES, THIN PICTURES, THICK ART
A perception in the presence of the perceived is a thick perception. One
can do things with the things and persons that one perceives: simple or
complicated things, like touching them tenderly or aggressively, addressing
them angrily, look at them longingly, etc. If we do these things while watching
a photograph of the other they would stop short at the surface of the picture.
The perception of a photograph is thin. I think that art practice, generally,
is concerned with the thinness of pictures and that artists are devoted to
making images thick again.5
A de-piction normally fixates and overpowers the way we perceive the
model’s original image. A painting, in contrast, may add something to that
image, and the way it does this differs from how a photograph, rather, sub-
tracts from the model. A photo decontextualises, it cuts off the context of an
event but retains its reality—in its visual aspect. A painting, rather, presents
a new, thick image.6
Something special happens when we perceive an image of perception: we
take care of the image, retain its meaning, keep it alive. Spectators should
be watching voluntarily, or at least have the idea that they do so. If they are
forced, this will connect a measure of irritation, and disciplinary force, to the
image. Watch duty irritates.7 Photos also discipline their spectators—works
of art liberate them.
An image can become outdated—from irrelevance. When this happens,
we merely notice it on account of its redundancy or its inaccessibility—we
are no longer animated by it. It doesn’t work any more. An outdated image
leaves us indifferent. Such images must be reanimated if they are to mean
something again. Who better than artists to do this?
Artists should not only not be punished for reusing an image and bringing
it to life again, they should be admired and rewarded for it—at least they
should be appreciated. Jeff Koons reanimated a photograph by Art Rogers.
Rogers should have been glad. In the final verdict, Rogers was handed the
last copy of Koons’ German Shepherd puppies. I can imagine a good rea-
son for Rogers to be happy about that: Koons’ sculpture had reanimated
his—outdated, rather banal—photograph. I hope he sees in the sculpture a
liveliness restored to his photograph. This aspect of copyright, too, Scholte
is concerned with: the right of images, or pictures, to an interested audience.
Think of his panels of matchbox labels, his marble panels, and so on (see
figures 1 and 2).
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Figure 2: Rob Scholte: Light your first currency.
III. MARBLES, FELT PENS, TOTEM POLES
Marbles, felt pens, totem poles: seeing these words together reminds one
of childhood. And rightly so. Marbles are glass balls with internal colour
effects—or so we could describe them objectively. If you want to grasp the
image of marbles, however, you will have to search your memory for the many
hours spent playing with them with your friends and other opponents. There
and then, you experienced the image in its full glory—the image of every
single marble—the sound of them bumping into each other. The unimportant
marbles, but also the most powerful, and valuable ones. The game wasn’t
just about winning or capturing the mightiest marbles, and elevating yourself
above the others. It assumed the magic presence of each and every one of
them. We did not even realise this at the time; that was how much we where
engulfed in the process. It is quite a feat to reanimate that image, as Rob
does in his marble light boxes.
I’m also thinking of Scholte’s panels with matchbox labels. I used to col-
lect these myself. Collecting, in a sense, is weird behaviour, even though for
everyone—including the collector—it seems as though the end of the collect-
ing, the completeness of the collection, is inherently reasonable (which it is
not, I think). ‘I don’t have that one yet. Do you want to swap?’ Meanwhile
you are bathing in the reality that each of these images has in store for you—
and in their type. Rob reanimates these images we all but forgot how much
we cherished them.
Felt pens. I remember the first ones I got at Santa Clause, early morning
december 6th of some year back when. Finally, I could do away with my
pencils, and start using felt pens—which colour swifter and clearer. You
could not erase them which was a disadvantage, but with coloured pencils
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Figure 3: Rob Scholte: Made in China. 2004
this was difficult already. I felt slightly guilty for smuggling like this. Colour
pencils have something more real, more authentic; they betray the flaws of the
drawer—which was why I wasn’t too fond of them. Felt pens were liberating
simply because they were technology: expressionless, cold. Rob confronts
me with two other images that I used to feed upon without realising it. I
always went straight for the end result: drawing, forgetting those things in
my hands. I also forgot, and again now regain this through Rob: these pens
were packaged in transparent thick plastic sleeves.
Scholte shows that image in full glory: coloured pens and their caps (figure
3). I revisit the ancient challenge of finding a cap with each pen, to prevent it
from drying out. Mostly, lazily, I failed to find the cap with the appropriate
colour, which, later on, caused new problems when a pen did dry out and
you would throw away the cap of another—still good—pen. Rob adds an
extra image that I must’ve missed of necessity: with series of felt pens you
can make nice colour combinations. I may have imagined that image, but I
don’t think I did; at least, it never sank in. Seeing Rob Scholte’s felt pens,
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one also realises how these images blend in with art history: with the colour
experiments of the likes of Goethe, Itten, Kandinsky or Peter Struycken (and
with rainbows). They are not naive images—no matter how vulnerable they
are in their everyday smallness. This series is called Made in China, the
political economic dimension is clear—as I said, this is not my subject matter.
Figure 4: Rob Scholte: Pots. 2008
Next, totem poles: magic piles whose grandeur has always seemed un-
fathomable to me. Totems and ritual dancing: an incomprehensible image
for me, city dweller. But the objects that are piled into Rob’s totem poles
themselves are images too. The image of these totem poles consists of plant
pots glued together into a new image, painted in colours that produce yet
another image (figure 4). The magic is still too grandiose and out-of-place
for me, I think, but the images are there and, also, include the surroundings
of the exhibition: you look through them and see the people behind them; on
the wall, you see the shadows of the lighting in the exhibition space. We too




Sometimes, artists who process other peoples’ images reanimate these images.
In all cases, though, they respectfully guard them. They do what spectators
always already do. They keep their meanings alive. Thus, Rob Scholte, in
The Embroidery Show, at Museum De Fundatie (Zwolle, 2016), shows images
that others made by hand, stitch by stitch. Are these embroideries ready-
mades? Marcel Duchamp chose his ‘unassisted ready-mades’ only when they
were visually indifferent to him. Duchamp tried to find something without
meaning—something clearly not an image (mark the paradox). Scholte is
not after this, with the embroideries, I think. In fact, I think he never is.
Duchamp ironised the status of works of art with his ready-mades: as if
something is a work of art only because it is on a pedestal in a museum.
Of course, Duchamp’s works mean more than that, but I’m interested in the
contrast now.
Rob Scholte doesn’t care for meaninglessness. He is interested in the
meanings of images and in who is in control of these. But one can see that
Scholte’s embroideries can be viewed against the background of the ready-
mades too, because he too does not create works from nothing, but uses
things that have already acquired meaning elsewhere, and—as in the case
of Duchamp—this includes everyday objects. Other than Duchamp, though,
Scholte clearly uses images that have meaning already, which meaning he
presents afresh.
Figure 5: Rob Scholte: View of Amsterdam (Embroidery).
How does one normally appreciate a work of embroidery? We all know
which people normally embroider: housewives mostly, of a certain age—and
less and less of them, it seems. Embroidery is working from a recipe: you
choose a design you like, select the proper yarn and start by making the first
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Figure 6: Rob Scholte: Praying Hands (Embroidery).
stitch, then the next, and so on. This requires dedication, but not genius. It
is as simple as ABC.
What is the embroiderer doing all these hours? She sets herself in an
easy chair, puts her stuff handy, pours in a cup of tea. Then, admiringly,
she scrutinises the picture that she chose—because she liked the painting so
much. Yes, she is going to cooperate with the painter, putting a knot in her
first thread and finishing that colour—she works on the front, where she sees
the image occur slowly. When the thread is finished, she connects it with
another one, at the backside, and so on. After approximately 10, 15 hours
of embroidering her satisfaction grows and grows. Meanwhile, she ponders
about her life, thinks about the kids that are about to return from school,
about the woman next door and her alcoholic husband, about the nice grocer
four doors away. I’m getting carried away.
A whole life accompanies the embroidery, but you can’t see that from the
result. What you see, is a cloth competing with a beautiful work of art, and,
instinctively, you wonder where that pretension is based on. Embroidery is
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kitsch, isn’t it? In the embroidered Street of Delft after Vermeer’s painting you
cannot possibly discern Vermeer’s subtle treatment of the paint on the original
canvas. Creativity? Relief of the paint, precision, detail? The painter’s
individual style—which Han van Meegeren so masterfully forged? An art
connoisseur will shrug his shoulders: there’s nothing artistic to embroidery.
None of that. The embroidery does not come near the original, it’s not even
a forgery, does not even violate its copyright.
And yet, like this, we fail to do justice to the image; to the many hours
of dedication of all these women, and the little practice they participate in;
to all these women who admire each other’s work knowing who hides in it.
We require a Rob Scholte to actually get us to see that dedication. He
noticed how these little works live on their backsides. There, you see how the
threads move about randomly; there, you see the knots. On the back side,
you see the image wrestling to come about. On the backside, you can imagine
the hardship of image making—more than in the finished image displayed on
the frontside. The back side does not expose or brusque the embroiderer;
rather, it shows her loving dedication. And for the embroiderers themselves,
the backside has always been an image, as well; they merely never showed it
to the others.
Who then is the maker of these images? Let us ponder this question as
if we enjoy the image that we are being shown, and gladly obey our duty to
watch. Vermeer did not make the embroidery; the embroiderer did not make
the image; Rob Scholte did not make the backside. The image is there and
in Rob Scholte’s embroidery it is managed and reanimated. Scholte confirms
the watch duty side of copyright law, and he teaches us, as well, to appreciate
our images. Honour to whom honour is due.
Rob Scholte does not make pictures, of things, people or events. He makes
images, by reanimating existing ones—though sometimes he makes new ones,
as well. A good artist tells in his work how it is that we should appreciate
it. Rob Scholte is a good artist. He is not committed to a style. His style is
a way of seeing. He sees images and, for us, brings them back to life.
V. CONCLUSION
What I’m saying is this: copyright is legitimated aesthetically. And what
this means is that another artist’s work should be allowed to infringe on the
copyright of an original artist’s work if and only if the later work reanimates
the original, and that includes reanimating it as something new.8 I don’t
mean that copyright is merely an aesthetic matter. But, perhaps, judges and
lawyers are not the right persons to decide whether a later, formally similar
work successfully reanimates an original. To assess that, we need art criti-
cism, but since when are art critics of one voice? My view here is that the
debate among critics should be about the subjective properties of the relevant
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works—whose subjectivity can be shared among people. Copyright infringe-
ment is not an open and shut case. It is at the heart of art practice.9
rob.vangerwen@uu.nl
NOTES
1. So I do not mean the image to be exclu-
sively visual. I merely concentrate on the
visual aspect here because Scholte’s works
are in visual arts.
2. Imagination can be stipulated as the men-
tal power responsible for holding the data
of our so various senses together—the
mental counterpart of proprioception.
3. Philosophers asked wrongly: Where then
are those images of ours? Are they in
our brains as mental representations? As
Wittgenstein said: ‘The concept of the “in-
ternal representation” is misleading, be-
cause it uses the concept of “external rep-
resentation” as a model . . . ’ Wittgenstein
1953, 196:d In our brains we don’t find
pictures, only brain processes—and only
when we use specialised instruments. The
images are there where we amass them, in
reality. Cf. Gibson 1986, Noë 2005, 2006,
and McDowell 1994, etc.
4. See figure 1, Gerwen 2016b, 309.
5. My view varies on Adorno’s distinction be-
tween picture and image, see Adorno 1973.
6. The power of photography to prove that
something has really taken place convinces
us that photographs are important, but
that does not remove the fact that they
also inhibit the dynamics of that reality.
7. See Gerwen 2016b.
8. Nothing much is added by this latter
phrase, though, since even downright ap-
propriationism can be understood as rean-
imating work into something other than it
was, it seems. See Irvin 2005.
9. This text, and Gerwen 2016b on Rob
Scholte’s work are based upon presenta-
tions at openings of exhibits of Scholte’s
works: in the Willem Kerseboom Gallery,
Amsterdam, September 13, 2009; and in
KuuB, Art dealer Meijer and Gallery Wed,
Utrecht, March 2, 2014. These texts pro-
cess Gerwen 2016a.
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